Evidence from management and business strategy research is divided over whether or not a firm should outsource the components and processes underpinning a new and potentially radical innovation. This investigation introduces ideas and evidence from the areas of supplier relations and industry clockspeed, and attempts to reconcile conflicting conclusions from earlier research by using a survey to measure supply chain management practices from a broad range of manufacturers in the UK. The results show that an industry's clockspeed has no significant bearing on the success or failure of any particular make-buy strategy for a radical innovation. The findings also indicate that maintaining strong ties with suppliers yields no significant long-term benefit for firms contending with radical new technologies.
Introduction
Make-buy decisions are an important aspect of most firms' overall strategic plans (Anderson and Weitz, 1986; Gertner and Knez, 2000; McIvor and Humphreys, 2000) , and the introduction of a new and potentially radical technology into an industry should therefore be a cue for managers to review their make-buy policies (Fine, Vardan, Pethick, and El-Hout, 2002) . Should the company make in-house the components and processes underpinning the technology, or should it buy them from a supplier? Building upon more general theories of the firm (Coase, 1937; Penrose, 1980; Williamson, 1981) , research in the field of strategic management offers considerable evidence which suggests that it is a good idea for a company to pursue a fairly rigorous "make" policy throughout the early days of a new technology (Afuah, 2001; Fine and Whitney, 1996; Harrigan, 1984; Hayes and Abernathy, 1980) . But other research prescribes exactly the opposite, promoting instead a "buy" strategy so that the firm can share costs with its suppliers (Cáñez and Probert, 1999; Kumpe and Bolwijn, 1988; Manders and Brenner, 1995) . A "buy" strategy is also 1 Corresponding author. E-mail: perrons@alum.mit.edu offered in the literature as a means by which a customer firm can access a broader radius of new ideas (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994) .
One possible explanation for this lack of convergence in the literature is that both of these strategies are valid, but that they are most successfully applied in different market environments.
The "make" prescription may be more suited to industries with either fast or slow rates of technological change, while a "buy" strategy might be more appropriate in market sectors where technologies evolve at a medium pace. This paper builds upon prior work on make-buy decisions in the face of technological discontinuity, and constructs two new hypotheses by introducing ideas and evidence from research in the areas of (1) supplier relationships and (2) industry clockspeed. Then it describes a survey that was used to measure supply chain management practices from a broad range of manufacturers in the UK and discusses the resulting statistical evidence. Finally, the paper will draw together the main points of the investigation, identify how these points constructively add to the existing body of research in this field, and underline the practical implications of this evidence to make-buy decisions and the development of new technologies in industry.
Literature Review and Hypotheses

Make-Buy Strategies for New Technologies
To keep up with the ever faster pace at which technologies are introduced into the market, many companies have turned to their supply networks as a source of innovation and new ideas (Fine, 1998; Piachaud, 2000; Quinn, 2000; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994) . Customer firms are also relying more and more on their suppliers for new innovations because of the increasingly prohibitive costs of research and development (R&D) (Cáñez and Probert, 1999; Kumpe and Bolwijn, 1988; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Manders and Brenner, 1995) . But this is balanced by literature that extols the benefits of "learning by doing," which urges managers to retain technologies in-house as a means to understand them better (Doig, Ritter, Speckhals, and Woolson, 2001; Fine and Whitney, 1996; Harrigan, 1984; Hayes and Abernathy, 1980) .
The literature also suggests that the nature of the innovation process often has a significant influence on managers' make-buy decisions. Citing Christensen's data from the hard disk drive industry, Fine and Whitney (1996) observe that "generational breakthroughs typically require an integrated product architecture created by a vertically integrated firm, with correspondingly limited outsourcing" (p. 26). Christensen (2002) offers an explanation as to why this is the case, reasoning that successful innovators in the marketplace tend to have products that are based on relatively integrated architectures. This happens, he says, because "competitive pressure compels engineers to fit the pieces of their systems together in ever more efficient ways in order to wring the best performance possible out of the available technology" (p. 36). By contrast, having standardized interfaces-what Fine and Whitney (1996) refer to as having a "modular"
architecture-inhibits the degrees of freedom for engineers working on the new product, and forces "them to back away from the frontier of what is technologically possible" (Christensen, 2002, p. 36) .
But this strategy may not continue to be the best one as the technology matures. "When the functionality of products has overshot what mainstream customers can use… companies must compete through improvements in speed to market, simplicity and convenience, and the ability to customize products to the needs of customers in ever smaller market niches. Here, competitive forces drive the design of modular products, in which the interfaces among components and subsystems are clearly specified" (Christensen, 2002, p. 36) . Fine and Whitney (1996) make a similar observation, noting that this process of modularization seems to occur naturally in the marketplace: "Within generations, components get defined and commoditized, the industry becomes more horizontal, suppliers are numerous, and outsourcing is easier" (p.
36).
Afuah (2001) suggests that the channels of communication within an organization are a key ingredient in an innovation's success, and contends that a "make" decision is usually more prudent than "buy" in the early days of a new technology. He points out that when a group of people are trying to develop a new technology, " [k] nowledge is often tacit-that is, uncoded, nonverbalized, and often embedded in organizational routines and in individuals' actions" (p.
1212). People can therefore work better and develop ideas faster within a single organization than among different ones. Preferring a "make" strategy in these circumstances, he points out to managers that "[p]roduct development requires frequent, often in-person interaction between the different units with the knowledge that underpins each of the components of a system" (p. 1216).
The issue of make-buy decisions for new technologies has also been approached from a conflict resolution point of view. The act of developing new products and processes necessarily requires the making of many decisions and trade-offs by groups of people with different goals and priorities. Chesbrough and Teece (1996) suggest that this is an important reason why vertical integration is usually a good idea for products and processes that are based on potentially disruptive technologies. They make a case for retaining new technologies in-house by suggesting that "integrated, centralized companies do not generally reward people for taking risks, but they do have established processes for settling conflicts and coordinating all the activities necessary for innovation" (p. 66).
A firm's suppliers, customers, and complementors-which Afuah (2000) collectively refers to as "co-opetitors"-are also an important consideration when formulating a make-buy decision for a new technology. What happens to their respective competitive advantages? It is fairly obvious that firms often lose competitive advantage when a disruptive technology renders their own capabilities obsolete. But the survival or failure of a firm's outside stakeholders is also critically important insofar as the firm's future success may hinge on the wellbeing of these other groups (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Afuah, 2000; Utterback, 1994) . Afuah (2000) argues that sometimes a firm's post-technological change renders outside stakeholders' capabilities obsolete. A company, he suggests, is necessarily linked to other organizations, and should not be regarded as a standalone entity. He accordingly contends that "the more a technological change renders obsolete the capabilities of a firm's suppliers or customers, the poorer the firm performs" (p. 399). Afuah (2001) later observes that, "following a technological change that is competencedestroying to firms and their suppliers, firms that are integrated vertically into the new technology will perform better than those that are not. At the same time, firms that had been vertically integrated into the old technology will perform worse than those that had not been" (p.
1211). His essential message is that the efficient boundaries of a firm are dynamic: vertical integration is good at some points, but not at others. The make-buy strategy has to change as the technology matures.
One of the striking things about the literature in the field of make-buy decisions for new technologies is that it seems not to agree on any one strategy or prescription. Some authors offer a compelling case for retaining new technologies in-house; others advocate outsourcing them to a supplier. A few even suggest using both strategies, but at different times. This lack of convergence points to the fact that the scheme of categorization used to analyze make-buy decisions in new technology environments is not yet complete. As Christensen and Sundahl (2001) suggest, an incomplete categorization system does not in any way discredit prior work; it merely suggests that " [t] here must be something else going on here" (p. 10). We believe that at least part of this "something" can be found within literature from the fields of (1) supplier relationships and (2) industry clockspeed.
The Importance of Long-term Cooperative Relationships with Suppliers
The managers who arrive at make-buy decisions are often driven by forces other than technology and the vagaries of the market. Foster (2000) argues that "human beings… engage in economic behavior both because of 'rational' economic thinking, as it is conventionally understood, and because of emotional arousal" (p. 374). And there is indeed significant evidence from the field of supplier relationships which suggests that businesses can benefit handsomely from developing long-term commitments with their suppliers.
Several studies point to the "lean" manufacturing system, which champions close customersupplier relationships based on trust, as a major factor behind the success of world-class Japanese companies (Gietzmann, 1995; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990) .
Moreover, there is considerable evidence that the close inter-firm relationships advocated by lean manufacturers can be successfully transplanted to non-Japanese manufacturing environments (Dyer, 1996; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996) . Porter (1980) also outlines the benefits of establishing stable relationships with suppliers. "Both upstream and downstream stages, knowing that their purchasing and selling relationship is stable, may be able to develop more efficient, specialized procedures for dealing with each other that would not be feasible with an independent supplier or customer-where both the buyer and seller in the transaction face the competitive risk of being dropped or squeezed by the other party" (p.
305). And Afuah (2000) suggests that "tight links to suppliers are critical to the success of manufacturers" (p. 389), and discusses the challenges associated with establishing new relationships with companies. Leifer et al. (2000) agree, adding that "all action, including economic action, is embedded in a social fabric of opportunities to interact. Interaction and ultimately cooperation are likely to happen among people who know one another… These personal relationships create opportunities for cooperation by deepening awareness, trust, and commitment among parties within the relationship" (p. 138). Other research points to important factors that contribute to these associations. Barney (1999) underlines the value of culture and reputation; Quinn (2000) stresses the importance of sharing goals, ethics, and a common sense of purpose. Many companies are moving towards systems of innovation that involve close-knit relationships with other firms (Sako, 1992) , and the technology management literature has also started to appreciate the increasing role of trust in the development of new technologies (Hoecht and Trott, 1999; Tidd, Bessant, and Pavitt, 2001 But maintaining a relationship with a supplier throughout a technological change is clearly a bad idea if the supplier is categorically incapable of adapting and changing to meet the new requirements of its customers. There is evidence, however, that suppliers can successfully make these kinds of changes. Utterback and Meyer (1993) suggest that core capabilities are inherently dynamic, and that a firm's skill sets can evolve significantly over time. Collins and Porras (1996) examine 18 firms such as GE, IBM, 3M, and Walt Disney that have led their respective industries over decades, and note that each firm has undergone dramatic revolutions since their early days.
The study also shows that each of these firms puts a tremendous amount of emphasis on its corporate culture, and regards its people as being the company's most important resource.
Relationships and long-term goodwill are therefore perceived by managers in these firms as being pivotal ingredients to their success. These companies have prospered not by mastering a specific technical skill, but by placing an uncommonly high value on relationships with people. What also stands out from this evidence is that these companies come from very different industries, thereby suggesting that a firm's ability to reinvent itself is not unique to any particular industrial sector.
The literature demonstrates, too, that technologies can be successfully transferred from one company to another (Afuah, 1998; Probert, Cáñez, and Platts, 2001 ). Thus, in addition to being able to reinvent themselves, suppliers are often able to learn the specific technologies that their customers are adopting. The sum of these two abilities point in an important direction: in many cases, a supplier can transform itself in a way that directly complements its customers as they move towards new and potentially disruptive technologies.
The Role of Clockspeed
All firms are not alike, however. Fine (1998) points out that industries seem to evolve at different rates-that is, they operate at different "clockspeeds." Though hard to define precisely, Fine suggests that an industry's clockspeed might be measured from the rate at which capital equipment becomes obsolete, the pace of organizational restructurings, or the rate at which brand names are established.
But if industries can have clockspeeds, perhaps people can, too. Relationships between people often take months or years to develop, and trust cannot be built overnight. Faster moving industries like the semiconductor sector, for example, might change and evolve so quickly that these links are seldom permitted to form, and trust-based, long-term relationships may not contribute measurably to a firm's success in those environments. At the other end of the spectrum, some industries that evolve extremely slowly-like the upstream oil and gas industry, for instance-also might not benefit very much from long-term alliances. The rate of technological advance in these sectors might conceivably be so slow that an entire generation of managers and engineers would come and go in the time that it takes for the next wave of technology to be developed. It is therefore less likely that interpersonal relationships would play an important role in the development of new technologies in these industries. Harrigan (1984) also believes that the rate of technological change would impact a firm's makebuy decisions, and suggests that "[d]ifferent vertical integration strategies will be more appropriate if technology changes rapidly (or slowly)" (p. 644). Recent exploratory research focusing on the Dutch manufacturing industry has indicated that this is indeed the case: fast clockspeed firms tend to outsource a larger fraction of their total production value than companies in slower clockspeed industries (Akkermans, Meijboom, and Voordijk, 2003 
Methodology
Survey Design
A survey was designed that asked senior managers in UK manufacturing firms about how their business unit dealt with principal suppliers during radical technology jumps in the past, and then measured the managers' perceptions of how their firm is currently performing relative to its competitors.
The survey instrument was designed and implemented using guidelines from Dillman's (1978) Total Design Method. The instrument was pre-tested by three academics and three senior managers in industry, and was administered by mail in the spring of 2003 to director-level decision makers in 1500 different UK manufacturing business units. A "business unit" was defined as an organization that produces a particular line of products (as opposed to a corporation, which might consist of several business units and manufacture several different types of relatively dissimilar products). Respondents were identified using a database purchased from a firm that specializes in business-to-business direct mailing lists.
Usable completed surveys were obtained from 45 of the business units in the sample, with multiple radical technology jumps identified by 17 of the respondents: 12 firms described two radical technology jumps, and five firms pointed to two jumps. Because different technology transitions may have been managed very differently within a single business unit, however, multiple jumps by a single respondent were considered as separate data points, resulting in a total of 67 usable responses. The unit of analysis for this study is therefore the individual radical technology jump experienced by a business unit. This approach for dealing with multiple responses is similar to that used by Tatikonda and Rosenthal (2000) .
There are indeed quite a few competing definitions of "radical innovation" both in the literature (Afuah, 1998; Christensen, 1997; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Leifer et al., 2000) and in the day-to-day parlance of managers in the marketplace. Accordingly, an important beginning point for the survey was to normalize the resulting data by ensuring that all the respondents were applying the same definition of radical innovation when answering the questions. This study is based upon the definition of radical innovation established by Afuah (1998) that focuses on the organizational impact a new technology brings about within a firm or industry. He suggests that "an innovation is said to be radical if the technological knowledge required to exploit it is very different from existing knowledge, rendering existing knowledge obsolete" (p. 15). Afuah (1998) notes that Tushman and Anderson (1986) have also applied this same concept to their research, but instead use the phrase "competence-destroying" to describe this class of technologies.
Two mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the survey respondents were providing information about only those technology jumps that are in line with Afuah's (1998) definition.
First, an explanatory paragraph was offered at the beginning of the survey instrument to underline the organizational focus of the definition being used throughout the questions, and to spell out with a real-world example exactly what the telltale signs of such a jump might be:
A competence-destroying technology typically shifts the fundamental skills and knowledge base of an industry. It often results in the introduction of new firms and fundamentally new product architectures and standards in the market. The leap from typewriters to word processors is one example of this kind of shift, as is the move to DVDs from videocassettes.
Second, via a series of eight tick box questions, respondents were asked about several definitional aspects of each of the technology jumps they put forward. The first tick box asked the respondent to indicate whether or not the innovation satisfied the precise organizational criteria established by Afuah (1998) . This box was an indirect means by which to double-check that the technology jump suggested by the respondent explicitly satisfied not only the spirit but also the precise letter of the definition being used for this study.
Dependent Variables
The success of responding business units was measured using four Likert-type 1-5 scales. The first, which measured the business unit's relative revenue market share compared to its direct competitors, was used as a reflection of success by Afuah (2001) . The other three measures of success-relative average profitability over the last three years, relative overall sales growth, and relative overall financial performance-reflect those used by Powell (1996) . Perceptionbased surveys have been used in management research on several occasions (e.g. Brouthers and Xu, 2002; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Hunton, McEwen, and Wier, 2002; Nicholls-Nixon and Woo, 2003) . Financial results from business units within publicly traded companies are usually aggregated with those of all the other units within the firm, and perception-based measurements were therefore used in order to assess outcomes at the business unit level. Powell (1996) defends this practice by noting that although "perceptions do not necessarily parallel objective measures of corresponding phenomena… [they] may be more discriminating than objective measures, and they almost certainly have more influence on executive decisions" (p. 326). And as Powell (1996) suggests, many ostensibly objective measures are based on assumptions and systems of classification that necessarily include an element of subjectivity: "one could argue that executives' biases do not exceed those embodied in accounting reports or four-digit SIC codes" (p. 326). As well, perceptual measures facilitate comparisons among privately held business units that do not publish accounting data (Powell, 1996) .
Independent Variables
While trust and interpersonal relationships might play a key role in the success of some supplier relationships, they are both abstractions that are difficult to measure directly with any degree of reliability or repeatability. Researchers in these areas have pointed to several factors that play a significant role in creating links between business units, and that may therefore act as a more measurable proxy for trust. Measured using Likert-type 1-5 scales, the proxy variables and their relevance to building trust are as follows.
New Suppliers: Firms that stay with existing suppliers in lieu of new ones can develop long and fruitful relationships that are based on trust and mutual understanding (Womack et al., 1990) . A positive correlation with the dependent variables would suggest that longer relationships are beneficial to the business units concerned. Scale: 1 = after introduction of competencedestroying technologies, business unit dropped/changed all principal suppliers; 5 = after introduction of competence-destroying technologies, business unit kept all principal suppliers.
Outsource: Sharing a long-term, trust-based relationship with a supplier would entail not keeping a new technology in-house in its early days (Quinn, 1999) . A supplier can best contribute to both the new technology the relationship if it is included from the outset. A positive correlation with the dependent variables would support this perspective. Scale: 1 = business unit initially retained in-house all skills and equipment required for new technologies; 5 = business unit initially outsourced all skills and equipment required for new technologies.
Able to Learn:
The success or failure of a business unit's move to a new technology often hinges on the ability of its suppliers to learn the new skills underlying the innovation (Afuah, 2000) . A positive correlation with the dependent variables would confirm that the ability of suppliers to learn new skills quickly plays a significant role in a firm's transition to a new technology. Scale: 1 = existing suppliers are unable to learn the new skills underlying competence-destroying technologies; 5 = existing suppliers are able to quickly learn the new skills underlying competence-destroying technologies.
Values Relationships: Business units that place a high value on long-term relationships with suppliers frequently do better than those that do not (Dyer, 1996; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Womack et al., 1990) . A positive correlation with the dependent variables would indicate that these priorities lend themselves to better performance. Scale: 1 = business unit places less value on long-term supplier relationships than competitors do; 5 = business unit places more value on long-term relationships than competitors do.
Costs Borne by Suppliers:
A supplier's willingness to invest in a particular technology is an attractive incentive for a prospective technology partner (Cáñez and Probert, 1999; Kumpe and Bolwijn, 1988; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Manders and Brenner, 1995) . A positive correlation with the dependent variables would suggest that it is prudent to invest financially in relationships focused on the co-development of new technologies. Scale: 1 = suppliers bear none of the costs associated with acquiring new technologies; 5 = suppliers bear all the costs associated with acquiring new technologies.
Past Role: Past exposure to problem solving with suppliers will cause managers to trust each other more and interact more productively (Sako, 1998) . A positive correlation with the dependent variables would show that this type of previous exposure to suppliers contributes to success. Scale: 1= suppliers played no role whatsoever in the development of new technologies in the past; 5 = suppliers played a very important role in the development of new technologies in the past.
Future Role: Similar to "Past Role," this variable determines how important a role suppliers will play in the development of new technologies in the future. A positive correlation with the dependent variables would point to a long-term benefit for business units whose managers espouse this outlook. Scale: 1 = suppliers will play no role whatsoever in the development of new technologies in the future; 5 = suppliers will play a very important role in the development of new technologies in the future.
Change in Strategy:
Business units may use their suppliers exclusively for their additional manufacturing capacity, thereby losing out on the benefits that might be gained by involving them in the R&D process (Fine, 1998; Piachaud, 2000; Quinn, 2000; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994) .
Managers behaving in this way would be regarding their supply base as a source of production capacity instead of innovation. A negative correlation with the dependent variables would suggest that business units perform better by maintaining relationships with their suppliers throughout the nascent and mature phases of a technology's lifecycle. Scale: 1 = business unit is more likely to bring technology in-house as it matures; 5 = business unit is more likely to outsource technology as it matures.
Control Variables
Clockspeed: Business units were separated according to the rate of change of product technologies within their respective industries. Based on guidelines offered by Fine (1998) , sectors that significantly change product technologies every two years or less were categorized as "fast," and were given a dummy variable of 1. Business units that introduce new product technologies every two to five years were labeled as "medium," and had a dummy variable of 2.
Respondents from industries that introduce major new product technologies at intervals greater than five years were categorized as "slow," and were given a dummy variable of 3.
Number of Employees:
Whereas a small business unit might have trouble maintaining supplier relationships in the face of adverse circumstances, a larger business unit might be able to endure short-term hardship in the interest of preserving its supplier links for the long-term. The logarithm of the total employee headcount within the business unit was accordingly included as a control variable.
Method of Analysis
Nonparametric methods were used to analyze the data. Parametric statistical tools are typically preferred within the social and management sciences because they are generally more powerful in terms of their "sharpness" and their ability to support hypotheses (Levin, 1987) . But parametric tools cannot be applied to the data in this survey because the observations are neither independent nor normally distributed (Cooper and Emory, 1995; Forza, 2002 ).
Spearman's ρ was chosen as a nonparametric measure of correlation between the dependent and independent variables. Used both by management researchers (e.g. Bukchin, 1998; Tamosaitis and Schwenker, 2002) and in related fields like economics (e.g. Dowling and Cheang, 2000; Neumayer, 2002 ), Spearman's ρ was selected because it is particularly well suited to the types of ordinal data arising from Likert-style scales. Table 2 presents the bivariate intercorrelations for both the independent and dependent variables.
The results show a strong association between all four of the independent variables, suggesting that success according to one of the proposed measurements of performance is typically a good predictor of success in all of them.
The extremely high intercorrelation between the Past Role and Future Role variables indicates that respondents do not expect a significant change in how their principal suppliers will contribute to the development of new technologies. This very high association could reasonably be interpreted as a deeply rooted belief among the respondents that the role of suppliers in the development of past innovations will almost exactly mimic the role that they will play as new Correlation is significant at the p < 0.01 level.
*
Correlation is significant at the p < 0.05 level. firms that did keep these links intact did not perform demonstrably worse. Thus, while a significant amount of management research (e.g. Dyer, 1996; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Womack et al., 1990) underlines the value of these relationships during the day-to-day operations of a business, this evidence draws into question whether they are helpful in the face of a radical innovation.
This conclusion has important implications for managers of multi-firm R&D partnerships. The rewards to be reaped by involving suppliers in the development of new technologies appear not to be quite as pronounced when the technology is radical in nature. The decision whether to develop a new technology in-house or with a partner should therefore be heavily influenced by the technology itself-is it potentially radical? Collaborative R&D arrangements with trusted suppliers may yield long-term benefits in projects involving incremental or more modest technological developments, but these benefits may be somewhat elusive if the technology will likely be competence-destroying. 
Hypothesis 2: Medium Clockspeed Firms Will Benefit More than Fast or Slow Ones
This hypothesis was also not meaningfully supported. Fast and slow clockspeed business units each had only one independent variable that was significantly correlated with performance at the p < 0.05 level. Medium clockspeed firms were not appreciably different: only two of the independent variables were linked to improved performance.
One interesting outcome, however, is that the independent variables contributing to the success of the respondents are different from one clockspeed to the next. Another particularly noteworthy outcome is that the Number of Employees variable appears to be a relatively decent predictor of success for business units in fast clockspeed industries, but not for respondents in medium or slow clockspeed industries. There is considerable evidence to suggest that larger firms are a more fruitful environment for the development of new technologies (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Hayes and Abernathy, 1980; Kumpe and Bolwijn, 1988) , but none of these prior investigations explores when and under what circumstances these types of environments are best achieved. The findings of this survey suggest that firm size might contribute to the R&D process-but not in every type of industry. Medium and slow clockspeed firms appear to be much less affected by this particular environmental factor.
However, it would be a mistake to believe that these findings will broadly apply to every situation. Abernathy and Clark (1985) underline that the unpredictable nature of the marketplace is such that one can never anticipate and build a framework that captures every eventuality. But as von Hippel (1988) suggests, we need not necessarily understand everything about the market in order to understand these variables usefully well and to make predictions that are correct usefully often.
Directions for Future Research
One major weakness of the methodology applied in this investigation is its failure to guarantee that every technology jump put forth by the respondents was truly "radical" according to a common definition. As noted earlier, the technology management literature applies a broad range of meanings to this label, and it therefore stands to reason that there is also room for misunderstanding and disagreement on this point among managers in the marketplace. Afuah Any future research in this area should therefore begin by zooming in on specific radical technology jumps in medium and slow clockspeed industries. The transition from drum brakes to disc brakes in the automotive industry is one particularly fruitful example.
Future research designs could also be tightened by more rigorously defining what a "principal supplier" is. The survey questions were put together to learn about relationships with principal suppliers that contribute significantly to the customer firm's competitive advantage. But our survey instrument essentially left this definition open-ended, and relied on the judgment of individual respondents to decide whether or not a supplier should be classified as "principal."
However, a responding manager may have gauged his firm's supplier relationships on a purely economic level, and may therefore have considered vendors that specialize in commodity items that offer very little competitive advantage. Such an interpretation would almost certainly distort our findings, and future research designs in this area would do well to control this variable more diligently.
A different system of categorizing clockspeeds might also improve the resolving power of this methodology. While Fine (1998) recommends segmenting the industrial spectrum into three categories-fast, medium, and slow-this approach might obscure meaningful differences. In many instances, firms with relatively similar rates of evolution for product technologies were classified in different clockspeed categories because of the boundary definitions outlined in section 3.4. In light of the fact that the respondents provided estimates to answer this question, however, one wonders how different these companies are in practice. Similar research in the future would probably be more compelling and statistically significant if the data were separated into two groups: fast and slow.
